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Abstract
An endogenous growth model with financial intermediation is used to show how government
policies towards the financial sector can lead to banking crises and persistent growth slumps. The
model shows how government deposit guarantees and regulatory forbearance can lead to permanent
declines in the growth rate of the economy. The effects of inadequate prudential supervision on asset
price dynamics under perfect foresight are also derived in the model. The policies that are used in the
analysis are based on essential features of Japanese financial regulation. The implications of the model
are compared to the experience of the Japanese economy and financial system during the 1990s. We
find that the dynamics predicted by our model are generally consistent with the recent behavior of
economic aggregates, asset prices and the banking system for Japan. A policy implication of the model
is that the impact on future economic growth depends upon the length of time the government fails to
enforce loan-loss reserving by banks.
Note: This is a substantial revision of our earlier paper entitled, ‘‘Financial Intermediation, Agency
and Collateral and the Dynamics of Banking Crises: Theory and Evidence for the Japanese Banking
Crisis,’’ presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Conference on ‘‘Financial Issues in the
Pacific Basin Region,’’ September 26-27.1
1. Introduction
The persistent weakness of the Japanese financial sector and its contribution to the poor
growth performance of the Japanese economy are among the most important current challenges to
macroeconomics. The high levels of non-performing assets held by Japanese banks have led to a
credit contraction and contributed to declines in economic growth. The current difficulties faced by
the government in resolving the banking crisis echo a recent history of weak prudential regulation and
supervision that are a primary source of the banking crisis in the first place. This paper considers the
possibility that public policy towards the financial system is a root source of the Japanese growth crisis.
The model presented here shows how a banking crisis can evolve endogenously and lead to a long-run
drop in the growth rate. It implies that the longer the government allows banks to carry non-performing
assets on their balance sheets, the further the growth rate falls.
We develop a simple endogenous growth model with financial intermediation and solve for
its equilibrium dynamics. The model incorporates three simple stylized facts about the Japanese
financial system. Investment is financed primarily by bank loans and equity issues. The government
guarantees the bank deposits of domestic savers. The government allows banks to raise its deposit
insurance liability over time through weak prudential supervision and regulatory forbearance. This is
represented in the model by the accumulation of non-performing loans against deposit liabilities when
the government fails to monitor additions to bank loan-loss reserves.
Production in the theoretical model displays constant returns to a single accumulable factor, capital,
and is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Under standard informational assumptions, bank
finance dominates direct lending by savers to firms, and bank loans are constrained optimal contracts.
Productivity shocks are independent across a continuum of firms at each date and over time. There
is no aggregate uncertainty, and both banks and households (as holders of corporate equity) hold
perfectly diversified portfolios. This framework focuses the analysis on the role of government deposit
guarantees (more generally, government bailouts) and inadequate enforcement of loan-loss reserves in a
developing banking crisis and persistent growth decline.
If the government continuously requires loan-loss reserving by banks, then the growth rate is
constant over time in the model. With regulatory forbearance, the output growth rate declines gradually
as non-performing assets held by the banks rise. The long-run growth rate falls towards zero with the
length of time that the government forbears. If the government fails to intervene before a critical date,
the banks will become unable to meet the deposit withdrawal demands of households for consumption2
and a banking crisis occurs. At moment of a crisis, the growth rate of consumption suddenly falls. The
model allows us to solve for the equity value of banks and of output-producing corporations and how
these change before and after the banking crisis. It also predicts a collapse in the market for collateral at
the moment of the crisis.
The dynamics for output, consumption and investment predicted by the model under regulatory
forbearance and deposit guarantees are compared to the recent experience of Japan. We also compare
the implications of the model for the stock market value of corporations and for banks, non-performing
loan accumulations by the banking system and the value of collateral assets. The strict interpretation
of the model in terms of the data requires us to date the onset of the banking crisis. However, a
maintained hypothesis of the model is that savers and investors have perfect foresight. The possibility
that households receive information about the state of the banking system suddenly with government
announcements in the early 1990s is discussed in our interpretation of the data. We also test the
relationships in our model using structural vector autoregressions following, for example, Tornell and
Westermann [2002].
We argue that the data are consistent with the simple dynamic model but recognize that some of the
relationships are consistent with other explanations. A special feature of our model is that it implies that
the ratio of the value of bank equities to the overall stock market declines before the crisis and ahead
of other macroeconomic aggregates. We incorporate this equilibrium relationship in a structural vector
autoregression as an orthogonality condition. From the calculated impulse responses, we find that the
data supports the predictions of our theoretical model quite well.
Our model of a banking crisis complements the traditional view of Japan’s banking crisis in the
1990s. The traditional view puts the blame for Japan’s banking crisis on the pattern of deregulation that
started in the mid-1970s.1 Briefly, as alternative financial instruments were introduced, higher quality
customers (that is, large, internationally-oriented firms) moved to raise funds directly in the domestic
and foreign bond markets. When large banks started to lose their large clients in the late 1980s, they
began lending to small- and medium-sized firms. As the asset-price boom in Japan in the late 1980s
collapsed, the Japanese economy slumped into prolonged stagnation. The small- and medium-sized
firms had difficulty paying back their loans and the non-performing assets of the banking system rose
rapidly. Japan, however, continues to be a model of a bank-centered financial system despite a modest
rise in direct corporate borrowing. Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito [1997] and Cargill [1999] emphasize,
as we do, the importance of explicit and implicit deposit guarantees and regulatory forbearance in the
crisis, although they do not propose a formal model of credit market dynamics.23
Our model is one of the few general equilibrium models that analyze the Japanese financial and
growth crisis of the 1990s. The Japanese banking crisis has affected investment and growth, while the
weak growth of the Japanese economy has aggravated the banking crisis. Because of the endogenous
dynamics between banking crises and growth, partial equilibrium models are severely limited. Two
other papers analyze the Japanese economy in the 1990s using a general equilibrium framework.
Hayashi and Prescott [2002] build and calibrate a real business cycle model for Japan and show that the
fall in hours and total factor productivity growth can account for the decline in growth in the 1990s.
Hayashi and Prescott argue that credit constraints were not important in lowering investment but
suggest that weakness of the banking sector may have played a role in lowering investment productivity,
although they offer no empirical evidence. As in our paper, Barseghyan [2002] emphasizes delays in
government bailouts of the banking system. In his overlapping generations model, the government
postpones the actual bailout but insists that banks honor their obligations to depositors. Banks use new
d e p o s i t st op a yo l dd e p o s i t o r s ,a si naP o n z is c h e m e ,l e a d i n gt oa ni m m e d i a t ec o n t r a c t i o ni ni n v e s t m e n t .
Barseghyan calibrates his model to Japanese data and finds a favorable comparison to Japanese growth
in the 1990s.
The next section discusses the stylized facts about the Japanese financial system that motivate
the simple assumptions of our analysis. Section 3 presents the endogenous growth model and its
equilibrium. The following two sections derives the pattern of equilibrium growth and evolution of
banking crises under regulatory forbearance. The comparisons with data for Japan and econometric
analysis are discussed in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. The last section concludes.
2. Three Characteristics of the Financial System of Japan
The theoretical model of this paper incorporates three characteristics of the Japanese financial
system into its assumptions. These assumptions are central to the dynamics of economic growth and
domestic financial markets before and after a banking crisis that are derived in the model. The first is
the predominance of commercial bank intermediation of corporate finance, modeled as arising from the
informationaladvantageofbanksoverotherlenders. Thesecondistheprospectofgovernment-provided
deposit insurance, or public sector bailouts of the domestic banking sector. The third is supervisory
forbearance and the absence of effective prudential regulation of the banking sector. In this section, we
review these three aspects of the financial system of Japan to support the use of our assumptions.4
2.1 Corporate Reliance on Domestic Bank Borrowing
Post-war Japan provides the picture of a bank-centered financial system. Until the mid-1980s, the
ratio of bank borrowing to total corporate finance was steady at over 80 percent. The remainder of
corporate finance was almost entirely met by issuing new equity. In the mid-1980s, restrictions on the
issuing of corporate bonds were relaxed leading to a rise in domestic and foreign bond financing. By
1995, however, the share of bank financing in the total was still just under 75 percent. This is a much
higher ratio than for the United States and for developing countries such as Korea, where the ratio was
50 percent in 1997 (see Dekle and Kletzer, [2002a]).
Typically, only large, well-capitalized firms could raise funds in the bond markets. Small- and
medium-sized domestic firms continued to rely on bank financing (see Hoshi and Kayshap, [2001]).
The fraction of small- and medium-sized business loans to total loans increased from 73 percent over
the period, 1977-86, to 78 percent over the period, 1987-1990, as reported by Ogawa and Kitasaka
[2000]. The reliance on bank financing was especially prevalent for small- and medium-sized firms
in the service, construction and real estate industries. Between 1987-1990, while bank loans to the
manufacturing industry increased by 1 percent, loans to the service, construction, and real estate
industries increased by 14 percent, 7 percent, and 18 percent, respectively (Ogawa and Kitasaka [2000]).
2.2 Government Explicit and Implicit Guarantees of Domestic Liabilities
Japanese bank deposits have been implicitly guaranteed by the government, traditionally through
the ‘‘convoy system’’ or the ‘‘purchase and assumption’’ rescue, in which a healthy bank is encouraged
by the government to provide assistance to a troubled one. Recently, however, the government has
provided implicit guarantees through direct injections of capital to troubled banks.
The origins of the ‘‘convoy system’’ can be traced to the forcible merger of weak commercial banks
with strong ones in the 1930s. During the 1960s and 1970s, the rescues took the form of healthy banks
offering not only financial support, but also personal assistance to a failing bank. For example, in 1965,
Takachiho Sogo bank suffered an increase in its holdings of non-performing loans. The government
decided to intervene and forced Nishi-Nihon Sogo bank to provide financial support, personnel
assistance, and business support to Takachiho Sogo bank.
In the 1980s, the burden on healthy banks increased, as financially strong banks were asked by the
government to merge with failing banks. For example, in 1986, the large bank Heiwa Sogo failed, after
accumulating a large share of non-performing loans. The government pressured Sumitomo bank, the5
third largest private bank, to acquire Heiwa and write off all its bad loans. The write-off of these loans
cost Sumitomo 111 billion yen in 1986 (compared to Sumitomo’s 82 billion yen in profits in 1985) (see
Hoshi and Kayshap [2001]).
As problem loans mounted in the 1990s, the frequency of convoy rescues rose dramatically, and
the convoy system came to be seen as an arrangement under which stronger banks were forced to bear
the cost of bailing out weaker institutions (Hoshi and Kayshap [2001]). Perhaps the most dramatic of
these convoy rescues was the bailout of Nippon Credit Bank in 1997. Nippon Credit Bank was rendered
insolvent by a huge rise in problem loans that essentially wiped out its capital. The government strongly
pressured Nippon Credit’s creditor banks and insurance companies to swap the debt for shares. The
financial institutions resisted on the basis thatthese debt-equity swaps would weaken their own financial
positions. However, they relented under strong pressure from the government. In the end, the resistance
of the financial institutions appears to have been justified. Even with the fresh capital, Nippon Credit
was not viable, and the bank was nationalized in December 1998.
The ballooning of problem loans in troubled banks and the low profitability in the banking sector
in general meant that by the mid-1990s, the traditional ‘‘convoy system’’ was no longer workable.
Foreign banks began to charge higher interest rates for interbank loans to Japanese banks, whether weak
or strong. In a departure from the traditional approach, the government resorted to injecting capital
directly into the banks. The first instance of an injection of public capital was in 1995, to seven housing
loan companies (jusens) that were technically insolvent as a result of the collapse of the real estate
bubble. Throughout the 1990s, the jusens borrowed heavily from commercial banks and agricultural
cooperatives. The collapse of the jusens meant that the lender banks and agricultural cooperatives,
already weakened by their own problem loans, would face further financial difficulties. The write-off
combined aspects of the ‘‘convoy system’’ and the new approach of injecting public capital. The lender
banks and agricultural cooperatives contributed about 40 percent to the write-offs, while public funds
covered the remaining 60 percent (Ito [2000]).
As banking problems worsened, the frequency of public capital injections increased. In late 1998,
the government injected capital by nationalizing and recapitalizing the most troubled of the major banks,
Nippon Credit Bank and Long-term Credit Bank.3 Subsequently, the injection of public capital took
the form of the almost indiscriminate recapitalization of all the major banks. The government sought
to recapitalize all of the major banks due to concerns that all the banks were sufficiently weak and that
discriminating among banks would cause depositors to flee from the weaker banks. To this end, in late
1999, the government set aside 43 trillion yen for the nationalization and recapitalization of the banks6
(9 percent of GDP), and all but one major bank and some of the weaker smaller (regional) banks were
recapitalized.
With regards to explicit guarantees, formal deposit insurance existed in Japan since 1971, but
the system was understaffed and underfunded. Following the turmoil in the banking sector in the
mid-1990s, the government sharply increased the capitalization of the deposit insurance system,
explicitly guaranteeing deposits up to 10 million yen (about 100 thousand dollars). Since larger deposits
were not guaranteed, the government in early 1998 issued an explicit ‘‘blanket guarantee’’ of all bank
deposits, regardless of size, until April 2003, to preempt an outflow of large deposits from the weaker
banks. The government recently extended these ‘‘blanket guarantees’’ indefinitely.
The government’s system of explicit and implicit guarantees implies that no deposits, large or small,
were ever at risk in postwar Japan. Prior to 1991, the official policy was there would be ‘‘no failures of
financial institutions.’’ Since 1991, banks have failed; for example, from 1991 to 1995, eleven small
banks were formally declared insolvent. However, the guarantees meant that no depositor ever lost any
funds.
2.3 Government Prudential Regulations and Enforcement
In our model, the failure of authorities to monitor the accumulation of non-performing assets and
holding of loan-loss reserves by banks until the deposit insurance liability of the government has
reached either a critical level leads to financial crises and falling GDP growth. Until the late 1990s,
the main responsibility for setting up and enforcing the prudential regulations of the banking sector
rested with the Banking Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Examiners from the Bureau would
visit all of the major and regional banks once a year and classify the loans according the examiners
perception of collectability. Banks with an increasing amount of irrecoverable loans were put on notice,
and if matters did not improve, mergers would be arranged with a stronger bank. All was done very
quietly, and behind the scenes.
This systemof prudentialsupervision leftwide discretion to thebank examiners and their supervisors
in the Banking Bureau. Moreover, many high officials of the Banking Bureau retired into executive
positions at commercial banks, where they maintained close contact with and influence over the
Ministry of Finance (the amakudari system). The relationship also included lavish entertainment of
bank examiners by the banks (Grimes [2001]). Supervisory forbearance seems likely in this regulatory
environment.
Awareness of the problems with the existing bank supervisory regime led the government to move7
financial supervision and examination from the Ministry of Finance to the new independent Financial
Supervisory Agency in 1996. The government also tried to replace discretion of supervisors by a
rule-based scheme, the Prompt Corrective Action system, in 1998. Under Prompt Corrective Action,
regulators are required to intervene quickly at poorly capitalized banks. For example, regulators are
required to close a bank if the bank’s capital-asset ratio falls below zero.
Initially, these institutional changes led to improvements in prudential supervision and enforcement.
The Financial Supervisory Agency moved to examine the books of all banks which led to the immediate
closure of five smaller banks. However, as the immediate financial crisis subsided, the regulations were
redefined to make them less restrictive. The introduction of the Prompt Corrective Action policy was
delayed a year. Accounting standards were changed, so that banks could make their financial statements
appear better than they were. Some banks that should have been closed under the statutes were allowed
to continue operating because the closure of these banks would add to local unemployment.
3. A Model of Growth and Bank Crises
A simple general equilibrium model of endogenous growth with bank-intermediated investment is
used to show how government deposit guarantees and prudential supervisory or regulatory failures
affect investment and output growth.
3.1 Production and Bank Lending
Output is produced using capital alone under conditions of constant returns to scale with stochastic
productivity. There is a continuum of firms, indexed across the unit interval, and productivity shocks are
independent and identically distributed both across firms and over time for each firm. The net output














t denote output, capital stock and realized net productivity for firmj at time t.T h e
rate of depreciation is set equal to zero for simplicity, and investment is also assumed to be irreversible
(this only simplifies the exposition of banking dynamics). To keep the exposition simple, αt can take
on either of two values, α > 0 and zero, with probabilities, π and 1 − π, respectively. It might be
convenient to think of π as close to one. Also, for simplicity, firms are treated as a continuum so that
aggregate output is given by
yt = παkt,8
where yt and kt denote aggregate net output and capital at time t.
Savings is undertaken by households who acquire bank deposits and hold equities in firms and
banks. All households are identical and infinitely-lived. Therefore, there will be no trade in equities in
equilibrium. There are informational asymmetries that motivate the predominance of bank lending over
any other form of investment finance for firms. Firms costlessly observe their productivity each period,
but banks can only observe it by incurring a positive cost. Banks are able to make these observations
at a lower cost than households so all lending is intermediated by banks in equilibrium. As Townsend
[1979] and Diamond [1984] show, the standard loan contract is optimal in this context (in a static
setting).4 The costs of observing a corporate borrower’s output is proportional to firm capital, due, for
example, to auditing costs that rise with firm size.








,(1 + αt − γ)kt
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− (1 + r)`t,
where r`
t is the loan rate of interest, r is the deposit rate of interest, γ represents auditing costs and `t
is the size of the loan. Competition among expected profit maximizing banks drive the interest rate on
initial loans to
r` = α − γ (1)
and the deposit rate to
r = πr` − (1 − π)γ = πα− γ, (2)
where loan size, `t, equals kt.
If a firm’s productivity is zero, then it is unable to service its initial loan. The bank can choose to
renegotiate that loan (including forgiving the unpaid interest), lend again, lend more or foreclose. In this
environment, the bank will not be able to increase the present value of future repayments by the firm by
adding unpaid interest to the loan principal for the next period (so that `t+1 >k t+1). This is because
the equilibrium competitive loan rate of interest already absorbs all of the surplus that can be gained
by the bank and depositors together from any cumulative investments by the firm. A bank will also be
indifferent whether it lends additional capital for period t +1to a firm that realized productivity equal
to α o re q u a lt oz e r oi np e r i o dt. In either case, the bank’s expected returns from relending the existing
capital, kt, plus any portion of new deposits received by the bank are the same.
The aggregate dynamics of this model are easily analyzed in continuous time. The flow of aggregate
net output is (πα− (1 − π)γ)kt, and the capital stock evolves according to the resource constraint,
˙ k =( πα− (1 − π)γ)kt − ct, (3)9
where ct is aggregate consumption. The flow profit of all firms is given by
dt = πγkt, (4)
which will be the rate at which dividends are paid to households for holding shares of corporate equities.
3.2 Household Behavior








with respect to its consumption plan given its flow budget identity,
˙ a = rtat + dt + xt − ct,




t rvdvas ≥ 0,
and initial deposit holdings, at. xt represents bank dividends. The number of firms and banks is fixed
so that equity shares cannot be accumulated in the aggregate, hence by the representative household in
equilibrium.
With a continuum of firms and independent productivity realizations across firms, households
can completely avoid any corporate dividend income risk by holding a fully diversified portfolio
of corporate stocks. Similarly, banks maximize shareholder value by holding fully diversified loan
portfolios. In equilibrium at each date, a proportion π of any bank’s loans pay interest r` = α − γ per
unit of capital, and a proportion 1 − π pay no interest while the bank incurs auditing costs equal to γ
per unit of capital. The bank’s losses at time t, (1 − π)(r + γ)kb
t =( 1− π)παkb






t = π (1 − π)αkb
t,w h e r ekb
t is the total capital stock of the bank’s debtors. The flow cost
of bank intermediation equals the current auditing costs, (1 − π)γkb
t.
The assumptions that allow complete diversification of productivity risk by households as
shareholders and depositors allow us to focus on how lapses in bank monitoring and regulatory
forbearance under deposit insurance or implicit bank bailouts affect investment, output growth and asset
prices. Introducing incomplete risk diversification opportunities or incentives could increase the social
costs of inadequate monitoring and prudential regulation. These are emphasized in the agency models
presented in Dekle and Kletzer [2002a and b].5
3.3 Equilibrium
As a starting point, consider the case in which the government requires banks to hold reserves10
against any loan losses they accumulate and enforces this regulation continuously. In equilibrium,
each bank’s losses on a proportion 1 − π of its loans are exactly offset by surpluses on the remaining
proportion π. The household return to savings is constant over time and equal to r = πα − γ.I nt h i s
case, bank dividends are zero at all dates in equilibrium, and the value of bank equity is always zero.
The government accumulates no liabilities associated with deposit insurance or other guarantees to the
banking system, implicit or explicit.
The equilibrium path for the economy is found by maximizing representative household utility with
respect to the consumption plan given the aggregate resource constraint,
˙ k =( πα− (1 − π)γ)kt − ct =( r + πγ)kt − ct, (5)
the predetermined capital stock and the parameter restriction,






to ensure existence of a solution. Under perfect foresight, equilibrium consumption is given by
ct =
µ






















kt = ˙ kt. (8)
We impose the assumption that r>ρ, implying that investment is always positive. Note that the






kt. Bank deposits, a, grow at the same rate as output,
r−ρ
σ .
The aggregate value of corporate equity is given by the present value of dividends, discounted at the
















which rises proportionally with the capital stock and output. Bank equity is zero.
4. Growth with Deposit Insurance and Weak Prudential Supervision
We consider the possibility that banks can accumulate losses on individual loans without reserving
against these in the presence of government guarantees of deposits. This will allow a bank to add
unpaid interest to a corporate borrower’s debt after the firm suffers a low productivity shock without11
accumulating offsetting loan-loss reserves. In the loan market equilibrium derived for this economy,
a bank can never recover the interest that the corporate borrower could not pay at time t if the firm’s
productivity was zero at time t.6 In common parlance, these non-performing loans can be evergreened
by rolling over the unpaid interest into new principal. While losses on the share 1 − π of the corporate
capital financed by the bank are accumulated as assets on the bank’s balance sheet, the bank pays





t, minus its operating
costs, (1 − π)γkb
t. Bank income before any additions to loan loss reserves is
(1 − π)(πα− γ)kb
t =( 1− π)rkb
t. (10)
Banks might wish to accumulate non-performing assets and pay out dividends from individual loan
net income if the liability of shareholders to the holders of bank deposits is limited. In the realistic
and conventional case, the value of shareholder equity cannot be driven below zero. The cost of
bank evergreening of non-performing loans is borne by either depositors or the government through a
depositor bailout. If depositors bear the cost and cannot monitor the bank’s accounts7,t h e nt h er a t eo f
interest received by depositors will be driven down and the growth rate of the economy falls. Note that
the interest rate can be driven to zero in this model, resulting in a negative growth rate.
We consider the case in which the government provides deposit insurance but does not audit the
bank loan portfolios or monitor loan-loss reserves. In this case, by accumulating non-performing
assets and paying dividends from loan income from performing assets, a bank accumulates a deposit
insurance claim against the government. Banks accumulate liabilities equal to the total deposits of
savers and assets equal to the sum of the capital stock used by firms net of corporate equity and the
deposit insurance claim against the government. That is, the assets of the banking sector that equal
deposit liabilities are the sum of kt and government debt, bt,s ot h a tat = kt + bt in equilibrium. These
government debts are not traded securities issued by the treasury but rather liabilities of the public sector
created by the banks.
There are two reasonable institutional constraints on the flow of dividends that a bank can pay
at each date. If the bank cannot meet its net withdrawal demand at any time, it is illiquid and we
assume that the government immediately intervenes. The second constraint is that banks cannot pay out
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kt.
This equals (1 − π)rkt, the deposit cost of loans that do not pay interest at time t. Our institutional
assumption is that banks cannot claim larger deposit losses at any time t than the deposit cost of loans
that actually did not pay interest at time t.12
We first allow banks to accumulate losses for a fixed period of time, from t =0to T. At time T,t h e
government stops banks from further increasing the share of non-performing loans in their portfolios.
In equilibrium, bT is determined, so that this is equivalent to setting a limit on bT and determining T in
equilibrium. Up to time T, dividends are bounded from above by net household savings. Each bank
can accumulate deposit insurance liabilities against the increase in deposits from savers, but needs real
earnings from capital to pay the net withdrawals of households that equal consumption net of corporate
profits.
The deposit insurance liability of the public sector accumulates according to
˙ b = rbt + xt, (11)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. The value of bank equity evolves according to
˙ V b = rV b
t − xt. (12)
At time T, dividends drop permanently to zero, so that V b must converge to zero at time T. Initially,
deposit insurance liabilities (equivalently, non-performing loans) are zero, so that b0 =0 .T h es u m ,
b + V b,g r o w sa s






for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. Over this period, the government does not recognize or cover its deposit guarantee
liabilities.
Imposing the solvency requirement for the public sector implies that after time T, the government
must collect revenue to meet its obligation, bT. We assume that the government does so by imposing a
tax on interest income, that is a tax on deposits, at a constant proportionate rate, τ. The deposit rate
of interest from time T on is b r =( 1− τ)r. The flow-budget identity for the public sector from T on
becomes
˙ b = rbt − τr(kt + bt)=b rbt − τrkt, (14)






τrkte−b r(t−T)dt = e−rTbT + e−rT
Z ∞
T
τrkte−b r(t−T)dt =0 . (15)
We let τ be constant for algebraic simplicity only (lots of integrals integrate out). For the same reason,
τ is chosen so that the government is solvent and the ratio of government liabilities to deposits stays
constant. This keeps the post-tax rate of interest, b r,a n dt h er a t i ob/k constant.
Now, we solve for the equilibrium growth path under perfect foresight. That is, households correctly
anticipate the future tax on interest earnings beginning at time T. The flow-budget identity for the13
representative household is given by
˙ k + ˙ b = r(kt + bt)+xt + dt − ct, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (16)
and
˙ k + ˙ b = b r(kt + bt)+dt − ct, for T ≤ t. (17)
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where








r − b r
σ
¶
kt, for T ≤ t. (21)
Consumption as a share of the capital stock rises monotonically, while the national savings rate falls,
over time up to date T.
The capital stock grows as
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b r − ρ
σ
, for t ≥ T. (23)
The function, ϕ(T − t,τ), is decreasing in t for t ≤ T,e q u a l s
b r−ρ
σ for t ≥ T and converges to
r−ρ
σ
as T − t goes to infinity. Under perfect foresight, the investment rate and growth rate of output fall as
non-performing bank assets accumulate.
Because banks cannot pay dividends after date T, shareholder value is maximized if banks pay out
the largest dividends possible up to time T. These dividends equal (1 − π)rkt. The constraint that
banks must remain liquid before date T is not binding if b r −ρ > 0.8 In the next subsection, we consider14












Differentiation of equation (24) shows that the ratio of bank equity to the current capital stock,
V b
t




(πα−(1−π)γ)kt,f a l l sm o n o t o n i c a l l yt oz e r ou pt ot i m eT. The total value of bank
equity (expressed in terms of the initial capital stock),
V b






falls as t approaches T, but will rise initially (as kt rises) before falling if the horizon, T, is sufficiently
long. This is verified by differentiating equation (25).

































After date T, the value of corporate equity grows at the same rate as the capital stock and output,
b r−ρ
σ .
Before date T, it also grows proportionately with kt and output for σ =1 , but grows faster than kt if
σ > 1 and more slowly than kt for σ < 1. For the standard assumption in calibrated growth models
of an intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ =0 .5, the stockmarket value of corporations rises
faster than gross domestic output up to date T.9 Under perfect foresight, the value of corporate equity is
continuous at T, but the growth rate of corporate equity suddenly falls at time T to
b r−ρ
σ for σ > 1. This
is verified by differentiating equation (26).10
Therefore, this simple model predicts that the value of bank equity will rise more slowly than gross
domestic output before the government realizes the losses in the banking sector (although it may rise
faster far ahead of the government’s assumption of these non-performing loan losses). The value of
corporate equity rises faster than output, and its growth rate suddenly drops to that of gross domestic
output at time T. A decline in the value of bank equities foreshadows the banking crisis, but a decline
in corporate equity does not under perfect foresight.15
5. Banking Crises under Perfect Foresight
By accumulating non-performing loans without offsetting loan-loss reserves on their balance sheets,
banks accumulate a claim against the government in the form of unrealized deposit insurance liabilities.
These public sector liabilities are the assets held by the banks to balance the difference between their
total liabilities to depositors and the real assets (capital) of corporate debtors. By paying out dividends
from what would otherwise be loan-loss reserves, the banks are making transfer payments from the
government to the shareholders. Eventually, the government must raise tax revenue to pay for these
transfers and in the model economy, does so by taxing depositors. The transfers come about because the
government provides either explicit or implicit bailouts of depositors without adequately monitoring
and controlling the accumulation of deposit claims and non-performing assets by banks with positive
equity value.11
Our interpretation of the fiscal policy adopted is that the government fails to monitor loan-loss
reserves and non-performing loan accumulations by publicly-insured banks until its insurance liability
reaches a threshold. This is a caricature of the policies of many governments that have faced banking
crises. It is clearly not an optimal policy if monitoring is costless. Under perfect foresight, banks
are able to meet deposit withdrawals, given by equation (20), for b r ≥ ρ, no matter how long it takes
the government to stop the accumulation of deposit insurance liabilities. However, the longer the
government waits, the lower the investment rate and growth rate of output after date T. The tax rate
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This can be rewritten using the solution for e−rTbT from integrating the deposit insurance liability

























where b r =( 1− τ)r, which can be differentiated with respect to T and τ to show that τ is an increasing16







b r − ρ
σ
,
falls as the government waits longer and accumulates more deposit insurance losses to handle.
If government regulators are lax for long enough, then the tax rate must be raised so that the long-run
growth rate becomes negative to maintain public sector solvency. Because household savings will be
negative, banks will need to reduce gross lending to corporations and corporations will need to scrap
capital. Our assumption that investment is irreversible, as a simple example of downward capital
stock adjustment costs, can impose an upper bound on τ, and hence on T. The growth rate, given by
equation (22), decreases continuously (under perfect foresight) up to time T to its long-run level,
b r−ρ
σ .
If b r<ρ, then the growth rate falls to zero before T, at some time T.A tt i m eT, the banks can just
meet the withdrawal demands of their depositors from the net earnings of capital minus the costs of
intermediation,
cT = πα− (1 − π)γ.
After T, the banks cannot meet withdrawal demand without demanding repayment of principal, kb
T,b y
their corporate borrowers. Because every bank faces net withdrawal demands at T in equilibrium, no
firm can repay the principal on its loan by borrowing from another bank.12 Raising the deposit rate of
interest will not work to temporarily clear the market because the deposit rate of interest, r = πα − γ,
already equals the highest value that allows zero expected profits on a loan. This is a ‘‘bank crisis’’ in
this economy. At date T, the government faces a banking crisis, so that the upper bound for the tax rate
and time to intervention is given implicitly by b r =( 1− τ)(πα− γ)=ρ.
Corporate capital stocks are interpretable as collateral in this economy. Before the crisis (t<T),
capital can be sold by firms to other firms and loan principal can be repaid at full value. There is a
market for collateral, and the equilibrium price of collateral (which is Tobin’s q) equals one. With the
crisis, a bank that attempts to reduce its corporate loans will discover that its debtors cannot repay
because they cannot find new loans. If the bank forecloses a loan, it cannot sell the collateral at a
positive price because no firm can borrow to purchase it. There is no demand for collateral at a positive
price in the crisis.
Thecollapsein themarket for collateralmightbe smoothed into a transition if banks areheterogenous
and become liquidity constrained in sequence. One way to generate bank heterogeneity in this respect
would be introduce assumptions that lead to incomplete diversification by banks (for example, that there
are a finite number of firms and increasing returns to scale in banking) so that the deposit insurance17
liability and current earnings of each bank depend on the particular history of productivity realizations
for its corporate borrowers. As time progresses, some banks will earn less from their loan portfolios
than others and may eventually not be able to meet the consumption withdrawal demands of depositors
from the net returns to lending. Suppose that the law of large numbers still works in the aggregate (so
that net output equals (απ − (1 − π)γ)kt with certainty). The earnings of banks with portfolios that
do well will offset the losses of banks with portfolios that do poorly. The banks that do well can make
loans to ex-borrowers of banks that do poorly.
With deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance, banks that do well face a finite horizon over
which to pay out dividends to shareholders. Current loan income can be paid out as current dividends or
lent to new corporate borrowers. Making new loans can only generate future dividends for shareholders
until time T. This suggests that the value of collateral should begin to fall as more and more banks
become insolvent before the crisis is declared at time T. With continuously enforced loan-loss reserves,
shareholders will realize future expected dividends over an infinite horizon if banks lend profit income
to corporate borrowers that need to move. In equilibrium, bank shareholders should be just indifferent
between receiving the dividend stream from reinvested profits and those profits as current dividends.
The price of collateral, q, will remain equal to one when the government perfectly monitors bank loan
loss reserves.
For several years, Japan dealt with the problem of troubled banks through the ‘‘convoy system,’’ in
which weak banks would be merged with strong banks. Bank heterogeneity would allow some banks to
have positive equity value while others become insolvent. An interpretion of the convoy system is that
the deposit insurance claim of a weak bank is absorbed by the shareholders of the strong bank. That is,
the shareholders of the strong bank acquire an asset of negative value. Under the convoy system, the
dividends that were paid to the shareholders of the weak bank become transfers from the shareholders
of the strong bank rather than from taxpayers.
This simple observation has two implications. The first is that the shareholders of the strong banks
have the same incentives for accumulating deposit insurance claims as did the shareholders of the weak
banks. Their bank’s portfolio did well in a lottery and on net they realize higher asset income than do
the shareholders of the weak bank. Or, keep the assumption of the model that households hold fully
diversified equity portfolios. Then the shareholders of both banks are the same and no present value
transfer has been made, yet. Dividends are paid and the government’s total deposit insurance liability
rises as the strong banks become weak until the government intervenes at time T<T or the banking
crisis hits at time T.18
The second implication can be drawn under the exact assumptions of the model economy (and, also,
with bank heterogeneity introduced). The convoy system transfers value from the equity of one bank
to another bank’s equity. The value of the equity of a bank falls if the bank becomes a convoy leader.
To maximize the value of shareholder equity, a bank’s management will want to finish paying out all
the dividends it can no later than any other bank. All banks pay the maximal dividends they can up to
time T. Banking crises take time to evolve because the flow of dividends is bounded at each date (by
(1 − π)rkt).
The regulatory and fiscal policy response used in the analytical model kept the tax rate, τ,a n d ,
hence, the ratio b/k constant forever after date T. Other possible policy responses include imposes
taxes so that b stays constant as the economy grows or b is reduced to zero over some finite horizon. In
these cases, the tax rate varies over time. For example, if the tax policy is chosen so that bt0 =0at a














The tax rate must be higher over the finite horizon than it is for the example in which the tax rate
is constant over an infinite horizon. The growth rate of output will be lower temporarily during the
resolution of the banking crisis, but recover at date t0 to its original level,
r−ρ
σ .
6. Application of the Model to Japan
The theoretical model shows how a banking crisis and growth collapse endogenously develops in
an economy with no aggregate production risk in the presence of ineffective prudential regulation.
Idiosyncratic production risk leads to loan losses that can be exactly offset by profits on other loans,
but which are not if banks can use these loan losses to transfer resources from the government to
shareholders. We argue that the practice prudential supervision and regulation in Japan matches this
interpretation very well.
The model predicts dynamics for investment, consumption, output bank credit growth, asset prices
and the value of collateral assets before and after the crisis that can be compared to the data. Some
empirical implications of the model are:
1. As the banking system accumulates a deposit insurance claim in the form of non-performing
corporate loans against which dividends were paid, the growth rate of output decreases steadily to its
post-crisis level and consumption rises as a share of output under perfect foresight.
2. The stockmarket value of the corporate sector can grow more rapidly than output before the crisis19
is realized for the empirical plausible case of inelastic intertemporal substitution (σ > 1).
3. The stockmarket value of the banking sector will decline before the crisis, implying that we
should observe a decrease in the value of bank stocks relative to the aggregate value of the stock market
before the banking crisis.13
4. The value of collateral in the model equals qtkt which grows proportionately with output until
output growth falls to zero in a banking crisis and the market for collateral collapses.14
Of the many simplifying assumptions of the model, two basic ones may interfere with a comparison.
The first is the assumption of perfect foresight. In the equilibrium for the model economy, investment
declines gradually to its lower share in output (and consumption rises gradually to its higher share)
before the crisis hits. If, instead, households and firms are imperfectly informed and receive information
over time regarding the magnitude of bank losses and future policies under rational expectations, then
investment and GDP growth rates will change suddenly as information revealing the deterioration of
the banking system becomes available. The second is that aggregate productivity for Japan fluctuates.
A temporary adverse aggregate productivity shock will lead to a permanent rise in non-performing
assets held by the banks in the model, advancing the date of onset of a crisis. As a consequence, under
forward-looking investment and savings behavior, it will have permanent effects on GDP growth.
Dating the onset of the banking crisis in Japan is tricky. There are at least two candidate dates. In
1992, the Japanese Ministry of Finance first admitted the presence of rising bad loans. In fact, the
early 1990s represent a turning point in the Japanese economy, with indicators such as GDP growth
and investment sharply deteriorating. The second candidate period is 1997 to early 1998, when several
financial institutions, including banks (Nippon Credit Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku) and major
securities companies (Sanyo and Yamaichi securities) collapsed. This period overlaps with a major
aggregate international shock, the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. We must remain agnostic
about the dating of the onset of the banking crisis. The realization that banks have large and growing
non-performing assets in the early 1990s could be the onset of the crisis or the revelation of information
that starts investment and output growth on the adjustment path predicted by the model towards the
major bank collapses.
6.1 GDP growth, consumption and investment
In equilibrium for the model, the output growth rate declines leading up to the crisis. Figure 1 shows
a significant decline in the GDP growth rate for Japan over the three years, 1990 through 1992. As
noted, we cannot assess when the future costs of bank bailouts were recognized by investors and savers,20
but the decline in the growth rate to lower levels that persist (and worsen) to the present is consistent
with the model.
The growth rate of consumption does not fall before the 1990s, but does fall as the GDP growth
rates fall in the 1990. Figure 1 also shows a slight rise in consumption as a share of GDP beginning in
1990. This is consistent with the model because it implies that consumption growth is not falling quite
as much as output growth. In response to the weak economy of the 1990s, the government of Japan also
increased transfer payments to households which could contribute to a smaller contraction in household
consumption as a share of GDP and may impact consumption growth. Hayashi and Prescott [2002]
point out that regulatory changes made in the 1980s reduced household labor supply, increasing leisure
consumption by about 20 percent. If consumption of goods and leisure are complements, then these
changes could raise the share of consumption in output but do not suggest a rising share of consumption
in output as output growth rates fall.
Figure 1 shows that investment growth does not decline before 1990 as it would in the model for an
anticipated crisis occurring in the early 1990s. It does show the decline in the share of investment in
GDP after 1990 as predicted by the model. This is consistent with an interpretation that the news of the
impending banking crisis arrives after the 1980s are over. Interestingly, the investment share of GDP
grows in the late 1980s leading up to Japan’s growth crisis. This is not predicted by our simple model,
but it is implied by our agency model (Dekle and Kletzer [2002a and b]. That model is not solved out,
but the suggested extension of the present model to add adverse selection by investors could generate
the rise in capital growth just before a crisis.
Another way to look at investment is to consider technological progress. Investment in new
technologies may generate returns over longer average horizons than aggregate capital formation. In
Japan, between 1970-80 and 1990-98, total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates dropped from 1.1
percent per annum to 0.2 percent per annum. (All data are from Fukao, Inui, Kawai, and Miyagawa
[2002]). The decline in TFP was especially sharp in manufacturing, where TFP growth dropped from
4.9 percent to 0.5 percent per annum. With regards to other measures of productivity, return on equity
fell from 12 percent in 1980 to 4 percent in 1998; and the return on invested capital fell from 6 percent
in 1980 to 4 percent in 1998. These compare with 1998 returns on equity and invested capital in the
United States of 22 percent and 14 percent respectively.
6.2 Credit growth and sectoral shifts in lending
Total bank credit in the model economy equals the sum of the capital stock of firms and the deposit21
insurance claims accumulated by banks, K+B, which equals the total deposits held by households.
These are growing as a share of GDP up to the crisis. After the onset of the crisis, bank credit should
stop rising as a share of GDP and will decline if the deposit insurance liabilities of the government will
be cleared over a finite horizon. These patterns appear in the data as shown in Figure 2 for Japan with a
distinct turning point in the growth rate occurring in 1991. This provides some support for dating the
beginning of the crisis in the early 1990s with a worsening as the GDP growth rate falls further in 1997.
A possible, but small, shift in bank lending is also shown in Figure 2. There is only a single good
in the model economy, but it is easy to introduce two goods, traded and non-traded, following textbook
models. A rise in the share of consumption in output will correspond to a rise in the share of non-traded
goods in output in standard models, which should correspond to an increase in the proportion of bank
lending to the service sector. This rise does not disappear when construction services are excluded from
non-traded goods, implying that lending did not expand to a sector in which borrowing is likely to be
collateral constrained. This is consistent with the lending contraction and collapse of the market for
collateral implied by the model.
6.3 Deterioration of Bank Portfolios and Fall in Land Prices
The model implies that the stock market value of domestic banks should be declining, before the
advent of the crisis. It also implies that the stock market value of corporations should be growing
faster than GDP before the crisis and drop to the growth rate of GDP after the crisis. This decline
would be indistinguishable from the collapse of the Nikkei bubble. Evidence in favor of the model will
include a significant decline in the ratio of the value of domestic bank equities to the value of the entire
stock market. Figure 3 shows the ratio of bank stock values to the total stock market. Consistent with
our model, this ratio started to decline sharply in 1987, at least 3-4 years before the beginning of the
crisis. That the ratio of bank stock values to total stock values leads other macroeconomic aggregates
is a unique prediction of our model, and distinguishes it from others. Because asset prices are very
responsive to new information regarding future dividend growth and real interest rates, they may offer
better evidence in favor of a model based on rational expectations than consumption or investment
which are smoothed in the forward-looking model.
In our model, prospective government bailouts lead to a steady decline in the quality of bank
portfolios leading up to the crisis, rather than a sudden rise in non-performing assets due to exogenous
financial or real shocks. The share of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans should be rising
before the crisis. Unfortunately, reliable NPL data are available only after 1992, when the Ministry of22
Finance first recognized the NPL problem. Figure 3 depicts the trend in the ratio of non-performing
loans to total loans. Non-performing loans rose sharply from 2 percent of GDP in 1992-94 to about 5
percent of GDP in 1996, and then to 7 percent of GDP in 2000.
The model does not include land which serves as collateral for a significant portion of bank
borrowing, but it does include irreversible capital as loan collateral which represents a fixed asset very
well after the start of the crisis. With a banking crisis, the value of collateral suddenly falls in the model
economy and the suggested extensions of it. The enormous fall in the value of land in the 1990s is
consistent with the collapse of the market for collateral assets predicted by the model. Figure 5 shows
that land prices in Japan declined by about 60 percent between 1992 and 2000. Between 1980 and 1995,
about 40 percent of all corporate borrowing was secured by land (Ueda [2000]). It is often alleged
that the sharp rise in land prices in the 1980s helped fuel the expansion in bank credit, which boosted
physical investment and economic growth (Ogawa and Kitasaka [2000], Ueda [2000]). However, these
narratives often ignore the fact that the price of land is an endogenous variable and is determined jointly
with other macroeconomic variables.
7. Structural Vector Autoregression Estimates
Our model yields relationships between the ratio of the value of bank stocks to the total stock market
value and subsequent investment, output growth and bank credit growth. This forward-looking ratio
depends upon the future increase in non-performing assets and, hence, deposit insurance claims that
the banking sector can accumulate. For example, a tightening of prudential supervision and regulatory
enforcement will reduce bT and T. This immediately lowers the bank equity ratio, V b
t /V
f
t ,a n d
subsequently raises the path of investment (as a ratio of GDP), lowers the growth rate of bank credit to
GDP and the present value of collateral assets (as a ratio of GDP).15
We use the theoretical implication that future paths of investment, bank credit and the value of
collateral respond to shocks to the ratio V b
t /V
f
t but not the converse as an identifying restriction in a
structural V AR to test our model. The procedure that we use to estimate the effects of exogenous shocks
to the bank equity ratio is equivalent to computing the impulse response function of a macroeconomic
variable to a particular shock in an identified V AR16. Our structural V AR is formed using four variables,
the bank stock to total stock market value ratio, the investment to GDP ratio, the bank credit to GDP
ratio and an index of land prices. Although we have not modeled land prices directly, we do model the
value of loan collateral which becomes a fixed asset in a crisis. We use land prices as a proxy for all23
collateral assets.17
We estimated the V ARs imposing the Wold ordering that current investment, credit, and land
prices are exogenous to shocks to the bank equity ratio. The theoretical model implies that shocks to
investment, bank credit and land prices are contemporaneously correlated. Therefore, we tried all six
combinations of orderings amongst these variables and found that the orthogonalized impulse responses
were virtually identical.
Figure 5 displays the impulse responses of investment (INVEST), land prices (LANDPRIC), and
bank credit (CRED) to a unit shock to the bank equity ratio (BSTS). Solid lines represent our point
estimates while dashed lines denote plus-one and minus-one standard-deviation bands. The initial
impact of an increase in the bank equity ratio is an expansion in bank credit, which persists for at least
8 or 9 quarters. The effect on land prices is small, but positive, and investment responds negatively on
impact but eventually rises. These results are roughly consistent with the model.
Figure 6 displays the impulse responses of investment, land prices and the bank equity ratio to a unit
shock to bank credit. Both investment and land prices respond strongly to a bank credit expansion. This
is consistent with the view that changes in investment and in land prices during the 1980s and 1990s
were caused by changes in bank credit. It is interesting that the effect of a bank credit shock on the bank
equity ratio is negative for about 2 years implying that an expansion of credit has a negative effect on
the market value of bank equity.
Figure 7 displays the impulse responses of investment, bank credit and the bank equity ratio to a
unit shock to land prices. Investment responds strongly for the first 5 quarters and then declines. Bank
credit falls on impact, then rebounds slightly and remains essentially unchanged thereafter. The bank
equity ratio is flat initially then rises, implying that an increase in land prices has a positive impact on
the market value of bank equities.
The responses shown in Figures 6 and 7 may address another hypothesis about Japan in the 1990s.
The ‘‘credit crunch’’ hypothesis suggests that if bank loans and other means of investment finance are
not perfect substitutes, then a decline in bank credit constrains investment. This hypothesis usually
attributes the fall in bank credit to an exogenous decline in land prices because land is important as loan
collateral.18 We find that bank credit impacts investment, but that the value of land does not appear to
affect bank credit. Land prices and investment appear to be simultaneously determined, consistent with
models in which land prices (as asset prices), and investment (as a forward-looking variable) respond to
the correlated future fundamentals.
Figure 8 displays the impulse responses of land prices, bank credit and the bank equity ratio to a unit24
shock to investment. Land prices respond strongly for the first six to seven quarters and then decline.
The response pattern of land prices to investment shocks is close to the response pattern of investment
to land price shocks, suggesting that land prices and investment are simultaneously determined. Bank
credit contracts in response to an investment shock, implying that banks appear to cut credit when
investment is robust. The bank equity ratio also responds negatively to an investment shock, implying
that an increase in investment has a negative impact on bank equity values.
Theresultshown in Figure 8 can be related to our modelifwe considerpersistentshocks to aggregate
productivity which can be modeled as a rise in the probability of the high productivity state. Such a
shock would lead to increases in investment and the value of collateral and to decreases in bank credit
expansion and the ratio of bank equity values to total stock market value.
8. Conclusions and Extensions
The model isstripped downtorevealtherelationship betweendepositguarantees, prudentialsupervision
and economic growth that comes about when transfers to bank shareholders or depositors are financed
by the public sector through future taxes. In the model, banks can effectively transfer future resources
from taxpayers to shareholders through inadequately monitored government-backed deposit guarantees.
A banking crisis can be interpreted as either the sudden realization of deposit insurance liabilities by
authorities or a simple liquidity crisis in which banks cannot meet the withdrawal demands of depositors
due to irreversible investment.19 The qualitative dynamics for the growth rates of gross domestic
product, investment, consumption and stockmarket values for the model compare very well to the
Japanese experience of the 1990s.
Our analysis of how deposit insurance liabilities affect economic growth emphasizes a simple
policy failure. If the government required banks to hold loan-loss reserves against accumulations of
non-performing assets, the banks would not have the ability (hence, incentive) to accumulate deposit
insurance claims against the public sector. The model also shows that the longer the government waits to
intervene in the banking sector and stop the accumulation of unrealized deposit insurance liabilties, the
lower the long-run growth rate that results. It can also be shown easily that letting the deposit insurance
cost of the crisis accumulate after the crisis lowers the long-run growth rate in our representative agent
model. The model supports the serious implementation of Prompt Corrective Action by the Japanese
government at any time.
Intherepresentativeagentmodel, shareholdersand depositors areidentical. Deposit insuranceunder25
regulatory failure affects economic growth because deposit insurance liabilities are paid by taxes on
the interest earned by depositors. An alternative approach would be to use an overlapping generations
model so that the transfer scheme redistributes from future generations to current households, even with
lump-sum taxation. This approach is taken by Barseghyan [2002], but with two-period lifetimes, many
of the dynamics of our model are lost.
In an earlier paper, Dekle and Kletzer [2002a], we explore the consequences of expected government
bailouts of depositors, implicit or explicit, with weak prudential supervision in an agency-based model
of bank-centered financial intermediation. The first version of this paper (Dekle and Kletzer [2002b])
elaborated that model and applied it to the Japanese context. In that agency model, self-financing
of a portion of corporate investment by a firm’s shareholders reduces the risk of low productivity
performance. With limited liability and deposit insurance, banks have incentives to renegotiate loans
when current interest cannot be paid. In the process of doing so, the riskiness of a firm’s investment
rises as self-financing declines in proportion to the firm’s capital. Over time, the growth rate of
non-performing assets rises over time. The agency model can be added to the current model to include
the extra dynamics of non-performing asset accumulation by banks discussed in our previous papers.26
References
Barseghyan, Levon [2002], ‘‘Non Performing Loans, Prospective Bailouts, and Japan’s Slowdown,’’
manuscript, Northwestern University.
Bayoumi, T. [2001], ‘‘The Morning After: Explaining the Slowdown in Japanese Growth in the
1990s,’’ Journal of International Economics, 53, April, pp. 241-59.
Cargill, Thomas [2000], ‘‘What Caused Japan’s Banking Crisis?,’’ in Takeo Hoshi and Hugh Patrick,
eds., Crisis and Change in the Japanese Financial System, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Cargill, Thomas, Hutchison, Michael, and Takatoshi Ito [1997], The Political Economy of
Japanese Monetary Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chinn, Menzie and Kenneth Kletzer [2000], ‘‘International Capital Inflows, Domestic Financial
Intermediation and Financial Crises under Imperfect Information,’’ in Reuven Glick, Ramon Moreno
and Mark Spiegel, eds., Emerging Market Crises, New Y ork: Cambridge University Press, pp.
196-237.
Dekle, Robert and Kenneth Kletzer [2002a], ‘‘Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises:
Theory and Empirical Evidence from East Asia,’’ in Jeffrey Frankel and Sebastian Edwards, eds.,
Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Dekle, Robert and Kenneth Kletzer [2002b], ‘‘Financial Intermediation, Agency and Collateral and
the Dynamics of Banking Crises: Theory and Evidence for the Japanese Banking Crisis,’’ Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Conference on ‘‘Financial Issues in the Pacific Basin Region,’’
September 26-27.
Diamond, Douglas [1984], ‘‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,’’ Review of
Economic Studies, 51, pp. 393-414.
Diamond, Douglas and Phillip Dybvig [1983], ‘‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity,’’
Journal of Political Economy, 91, June, pp. 401-419.
Freixas, Xavier and Jean-Charles Rochet [1997], Microeconomics of Banking,C a m b r i d g e ,M A :
MIT Press.
Fukao, Kyoji, Inui, Tomohiko, Kawai, Hiroki, and Tsutomu Miyagawa [2002], ‘‘Sectoral
Productivity and Economic Growth in Japan: 1970-98,’’ manuscript, Hitostubashi University.
Grimes, William [2001], Unmaking the Japanese Miracle, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hamilton, James [1994], Time Series Analysis, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Hayashi, Fumio and Edward Prescott [2002], ‘‘The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade,’’ manuscript,
University of Minnesota.
Hoshi, Takeo and Anil Kashyap [1999], ‘‘The Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come from
and How Will it End,’’ in Ben Bernanke and Jerome Rotemberg, eds., NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, 1999,C a m b r i d g e :M I TP r e s s .27
Hoshi, Takeo and Anil Kayshap [2001], Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan,
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hoshi, Takeo and Hugh Patrick [2000], ‘‘The Japanese Financial System: An Introductory
Overview,’’ in Takeo Hoshi and Hugh Patrick, eds., Crisis and Change in the Japanese Financial
System, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hutchison, Michael [1998], ‘‘Are all Banking Crisis Alike?’’ University of California, Santa Cruz,
Working Paper.
Ito, Takatoshi [2000], ‘‘The Stagnant Japanese Economy in the 1990s: The Need for Financial
Supervision to Restore Sustained Growth,’’ in Takeo Hoshi and Hugh Patrick, eds., Crisis and Change
in the Japanese Financial System, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kwon, E. [1998], ‘‘Monetary Policy, Land Prices, and the Collateral Effects on Economic
Fluctuations: Evidence from Japan,’’ Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 12, pp.
175-203.
Ogawa, Kazuo and Shinichi Kitasaka [2000], ‘‘Bank Lending in Japan: Its Determinants and
Macroeconomic Implications,’’ in Takeo Hoshi and Hugh Patrick, eds., Crisis and Change in the
Japanese Financial System, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Townsend, Robert M. [1979], ‘‘Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State
V erification,’’ Journal of Economic Theory 21, no.2 (October), pp. 265-93.
Ueda, Kazuo [2000], ‘‘Causes of Japan’s Banking Problems in the 1990s,’’ in Takeo Hoshi and Hugh
Patrick, eds., Crisis and Change in the Japanese Financial System, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.28
Endnotes
1This interpretation is explained at length in Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito [1997], Hutchison [1998], Hoshi and Patrick [2000],
Hoshi and Kashyap [1999], Hoshi and Kashyap [2002].
2Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito [1997] draw a more comprehensive picture of what caused the banking crisis in Japan. In
particular, they emphasize the role played by monetary policy in precipitating the banking crisis. Monetary policy was easy
between 1986 and 1988 and asset prices lost touch with fundamentals. The sudden shift to tight money in 1989 was responsible
for the start of the asset deflation process. Since most bank loans were made using land as collateral, the collapse in land prices
l e dt oas u r g ei nn o n - p e r f o r m i n gl o a n s .
3Eventually, the government sold Nippon Credit to a software company and Long-Term Credit Bank toa foreignhedge fund.
4The derivation of simple loan contracts is explained in Freixas and Rochet [1997].
5This version of the agency model is first proposed in Chinn and Kletzer [2001] for the East Asian crisis.
6This is because the (competitive) equilibrium interest charged to firms borrowing capital, kt,e q u a l sr
`kt =( α − γ)kt,
and the interest paid to depositors equals rkt =( πα − γ)kt.
7Depositor monitoring of each bank’s accounts would allow reputational equilibria, for example.
8Perfect foresight is responsible for this conclusion. To see this, suppose taxes were non-distortionary (lump sum) so that
Ricardian equivalence held. All dividend income would be saved as deposits against future taxes implying that the increase in
deposit liabilitiesgeneratedby bankaccumulationsof non-performingassetswouldbeentirelysaved. Without perfect foresight,
households would consume a portion of the deposit insurance liability of the government before dateT and consumption would
outgrow net output. Adding the tax distortion just increases the cost to savers of banks accumulating deposit claims against
non-performing assets.
9For example, Hayashi and Prescott [2002] assume that 1/σ =0 .5 in their calibrated model for Japan.
10It may be useful to point out that the calculation of corporate equity does not leave out the debt burden of corporations.





kt which just equals (1 − π)rkt, the additions to corporate borrowing due
to the evergreening of interest payments for firms with low productivity realizations. The expression for V
f
t , present value of
the corporate sector equity, nets out the addition to corporate debt at every date. The present value of corporate debt at any date
equals the capital stock, kt.
11In our model, positive bank equity values also result from this policy combination because it allows banks to pay out
dividends against uncollected corporate interest.
12An existing or new firm could not buy all or part of the firm’s capital either, since it could not obtain a loan from the banks
to do so.
13Under perfect foresight, corporate stock values grow in proportion to gross domestic product after the crisis for a constant
tax rate. If the tax rate varies over time (for example, to eliminate the deposit insurance liability, b, in finite time), the growth
rate of the value of the stock market will be different than the growth rate of output during the transition to the long-run simply
because the value of equity is a forward-looking variable. Therefore, it should not be taken as a prediction of our model that the
value of the stock market grows with output after time T because its behavior will depend on the policies adopted to resolve the
crisis or private sector expectations with respect to these policies.
14Investment irreversibility is used in the model for analytical simplicity. If smooth adjustment costs to disinvestment were
introduced, then a bankingcrisis would result incorporate bankruptcies and a falling price of capital, qt. Whilethemodelshows
that transactions in collateral should drop to zero in a crisis, it also implies that under more general adjustment costs the value
of collateral should fall below the growth rate of output in a crisis.
15 This statement allows for costly capital stock adjustment.29
16This is explained in Hamilton [1994], pp. 327-329.
17All the data are quarterly and are from the Statistics Bank on the webpage of the Bank of Japan. We use data from the first
quarter of 1980 to the second quarter of 2002. Stationarity tests showed that all four variables are non-stationary in levels, and
stationary in first-differences. However, we estimate our S-V ARs in levels, since as Hamilton [1994, Ch. 18] shows, a V AR
with unit roots can always be written as a V AR representation in which the coefficient distributions are asymptotically Gaussian.




19We could introduce gestation lags in investment to achieve the same thing, but the multiple equilibrium models of liquidity
panics unnecessarily embellish the model. In contrast to models based on Diamond and Dybvig [1983], crisis in our model
occurs deterministically as a unique equilibrium outcome under given regulatory and fiscal policy.            Figure 1: Consumption, Investment, and GDP Growth Rates     
            
            
            
            



































Consumption Rate Investment Rate Real GDP Growth  Figure 3: Ratio of Bank Stocks/Total Stock Market                                                              
          
          
         


























































Bank Stock/Total StockFigure 5: Responses of Investment, Land Prices, and Credit 
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One S.D. BSTS InnovationFigure 6: Responses of Investment, Land Prices, and Bank Stocks 
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Figure 7: Responses of Investment, Credit, and Bank Stocks 
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One S.D. LANDPRIC InnovationFigure 8:  Responses of Land Prices, Credit, and Bank Stocks 
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